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Personal injury claims arising from the use of asbestos have
been a disaster for many in addition to those who were harmed by
exposure to that product. A lesson to be learned from the experience
is that disasters of such a scale and such complex causes have
radiating consequences that neither our judicial system nor our
legislatures have been able to address seasonably. Indeed, the
failures call into question the utility of our “blame game” as a
method of addressing the social and political issues of public health
and work-related disabilities.
One consequence of the crisis has been an epidemic of broad
accusations. On the one hand, asbestos claims have occasioned
much adverse comment about the trial lawyers representing
claimants. On the other, an equal amount of venom has been
directed at corporate management for its negligence in failing to
protect consumers, workers, and their families from known hazards
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resulting in long-delayed but enormous medical and economic
harms. Some of the criticism on both sides has been earned. But
responsibility lies broadly on the public and its elected
representatives for their failure to respond in a timely and useful way
to very serious problems confronted by thousands of businesses,
millions of people, and by our judicial systems, both state and
federal. The Congress of the United States is particularly deserving
of a failing grade.
Virtually overlooked in the exchange of name-calling,
however, has been the role of third parties sharing responsibility for
the harm and receiving benefits associated with the risks to which
the victims were exposed. The state and federal governments
equally failed to regulate Corporate America when they could have
prevented the taking of profits at excessive risk and expense to
employees and consumers. Behind that governmental neglect are the
American citizens and their congressmen who have failed to accept
responsibility for the consequences of their disinclination to regulate
business to prevent foreseeable harms to fellow citizens.
Also, almost unnoticed is the revelation that the American
legal system, as we have known it, simply does not work in matters
presenting issues of fact requiring consideration of scientific
evidence as complex as that needed to sort out the consequences of a
plaintiff’s historic exposure to asbestos. This is especially so when
similar but distinct issues are presented by the tens of thousands at a
time. The adaptations made to deal with such issues on the scale
required are not acceptable to any sound notion of due process of
law. Having made this defense of the courts, it ought also be
acknowledged that the judiciary has also at times neglected duties it
could have performed. To make these points, a brief history of the
subject is required.

I.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF ASBESTOS
A.

The Advent of the Crisis: Prehistory to 1972

Asbestos is a common mineral. It was employed by ancient
Greeks as “the magic mineral” shielding structures from fire because
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of its resistance to heat.1 Its use over thousands of years prevented
many misfortunes. The substance occurs naturally in much of the
world’s drinking water and its fibers can be found in a wide array of
foods and commercial products such as tonics and mouthwashes.2 In
the 1860s it was first commercially used in the United States as
insulation.3 In 1931, a technique was developed for mixing the
mineral in cement. It came to be used in brake linings that might
overheat. And it was also widely used to cover pipes used to
transmit heated air or fluids.
The asbestos industry in the United States was long
dominated by The Johns-Manville Corp. It mined the material and
fabricated it for a wide range of uses, primarily in the construction
and maritime industries. Much of its product was sold to
intermediate companies for use in their products. For example, in
1880, Babcock & Wilcox began to design, construct, and sell large
commercial boilers for use in power plants, factories, and ships.
B&W used asbestos as a lining for its boilers to protect workers and
equipment from the high temperatures generated and to assure
thermal efficiency of its boilers. Hundreds of thousands of
American workers have at some time in their lives worked around a
B&W boiler.
As early as the 1930s, executives of The Johns-Manville
Corp. were aware of an occupational hazard to miners and factory
workers who were exposed to the material.4 The information was
not a secret, but neither was it advertised. It was optimistically
assumed that the risk of inhalation by others, such as shipyard or
construction workers, was negligible. The Americans who were at
work in the 1930s, and the executives of Johns-Manville, Babcock &
1. In 430 B.C. it was used in lamp wicks and denoted as Carpathian flax.
Romans used it as a cremation garment to conserve the remains of persons of
noble rank. Charlemagne used it for a table cloth that could be washed in fire.
NAT’L INST. OF HEALTH, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH EDUC. & WELFARE, PUBL’N NO.
78-1681, ASBESTOS: AN INFORMATION RESOURCE 1 (Richard J. Levine ed., 1978).
2. Andrew Churg, Non-neoplastic Diseases Caused by Asbestos, in
PATHOLOGY OF OCCUPATIONAL LUNG DISEASE 213, 219-22 (Andrew Churg &
Francis H. Y. Green eds., 1988); see also Mesothelioma SOS – Types of Asbestos,
http://www.mesotheliomasos.com/asbestosTypes.php (last visited April 23, 2007)
(listing additional uses of asbestos).
3. In re Joint E. & S. Dists. Asbestos Litig., 129 B. R. 710, 735 (Bankr. E. &
S.D.N.Y. 1991).
4. PAUL BRODEUR, OUTRAGEOUS MISCONDUCT: THE ASBESTOS INDUSTRY
ON TRIAL 5, 112-13 (1985).

586

THE REVIEW OF LITIGATION

[Vol. 26:3

Wilcox or other firms, at that time, grew up expecting to die before
they were sixty years old.5 The risk of infections that might affect
the health of workers twenty or thirty years after an exposure—as
was the case with asbestos-related injuries—was not a risk deemed
worthy of serious attention by most people, even many of the
workers themselves.
And given the legal standards of the day, no business
executive in 1940 had reason to think of the possibility of corporate
liability for harms occurring decades into the future. The law of torts
was not then recognized in most states as a primary means of
regulating business to discourage management from consciously
taking risks with the health and safety of consumers and workers. It
was only after 1960 that tort law became recognized as public law,6
and only then did American courts begin to interpret statutes of
limitations as providing for a time to sue that begins to run only
when the harm is discovered by the victim.7 A business executive
who had decided in 1940 not to incur the risk to others of making or
using asbestos could have been justifiably dismissed for cause by
shareholders expecting diligent pursuit of profits.
Among the consumers of asbestos, the largest by far was the
United States Navy. During World War II, the Navy stockpiled
asbestos as a strategic resource needed to reduce the fire hazard on
thousands of vessels constructed at that time for use in combat. Four
and a half million Americans were employed in shipyards at that
time and were there exposed to the risk of inhalation of asbestos

5. See NAT’L CTR. FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, LIFE EXPECTANCY AT
BIRTH, AT 65 YEARS OF AGE, AND AT 75 YEARS OF AGE, ACCORDING TO RACE AND
SEX: UNITED STATES, SELECTED YEARS 1900-2001, 133 tbl. 27 (2003), available
at http//www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/hus/tables/2003/03hus027.pdf (showing average
life expectancy in 1900 was 47 years, rising to 77 years at the end of the century).
6. Leon Green, Tort Law as Public Law in Disguise [Installment I], 38 TEX.
L. REV. 1 (1959); Leon Green, Tort Law as Public Law in Disguise [Installment
II], 38 TEX. L. REV. 257 (1960). See also LEON GREEN, JUDGE AND JURY (1930)
(describing the regulatory role of tort law); WILLIAM L. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS
(1941) (recognizing the regulatory role of tort law).
7. Kim Marie Covello, Note, Wilson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp. and
Statutes of Limitations in Latent-Injury Litigation: an Equitable Expansion of the
Discovery Rule, 32 CATH. U. L. REV. 471 (1983).
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fibers.8 Many of those now dead died of causes to which their
exposure to asbestos may have contributed. The Navy was not
unaware of risks, but apparently concluded that c’est la guerre.9
Countless sailors who survived naval combat owed their survival to
the use of asbestos. But the shipbuilders on whom the compensating
risks were imposed were not, alas, provided with the medical
services afforded those in uniform through the Veterans’
Administration.
Even back on land, whatever the long-term risk to workers
and consumers from the use of asbestos, it was not unreasonably
deemed to be more than offset by the reduction in the risk of harm to
others by fire. It is not unlikely that tens or even hundreds of
thousands of Americans were spared a scorching death because of
the use of asbestos in buildings and ships. Whether on balance there
would have been less suffering in America if asbestos had been
taken off the market in 1920 when some knowledge of its possible
effects on respiration first materialized is a question with no clear
answer.
Gradually it was revealed by medical research that the risks
associated with the inhalation of asbestos fibers had been
underestimated. A cause of the underestimation was that the harm
caused by the exposure was latent. No one inhales a breath of
asbestos and dies, or even loses breath. In time, he or she might—
but might not—develop pleural fibrosis plaque, a thickening of the
lung tissue visible to x-ray. This was long thought to be merely a
benign marker of exposure.10 However, even a person with that
symptom might—but might not—develop asbestosis, an impairment
of respiration. That impairment could possibly occur in a few
months, but more often would not occur for decades. It might
become a serious impairment of respiration, but generally the
impairment experienced, if any, was no more serious than the
impairment experienced by cigarette smokers.
8. JOSEPH A. ARTABANE & CATHERINE R. BAUMER, DEFUSING THE
ASBESTOS LITIGATION CRISIS: THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE U. S. GOVERNMENT 421 (1986).
9. See Lester Brickman, The Asbestos Litigation Crisis: Is There A Need for
an Administrative Alternative?, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 1819, 1884-86 (1992)
(explaining the government’s possible knowledge of the hazards of asbestos
exposure and the perceived importance of asbestos to the war effort).
10. Arnold R. Brody, Asbestos, in TOXICOLOGY OF THE RESPIRATORY
SYSTEM 393, 394 (Robert A. Roth ed., 2000).
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By 1935, there was published evidence that asbestos
exposure correlated with lung cancer, and in 1955 a paper was
published reporting that those exposed to asbestos fibers for twenty
years were ten times more likely to contract lung cancer.11 But given
the rarity of lung cancer, this was still a small if significant long-term
health risk. Further study in the 1960s revealed that this result was
associated with smoking tobacco; the two exposures together created
a magnified likelihood that the worker exposed to asbestos who also
smokes would contract lung cancer. It was also then discovered that
over a period of 15 to 40 years, a person with asbestosis might
contract a particularly deadly form of cancer, mesothelioma, a
development that seems to have no correlation to smoking tobacco.12
By 1970, it was reasonably clear that some workers exposed
to asbestos would over a period of decades contract asbestosis and
might be increasingly disabled by that condition, some might
develop secondary medical problems associated with the asbestosis,
some would develop lung cancers, and a few would develop
mesothelioma.
After 1973, the use of asbestos declined sharply as
knowledge of the risks spread and as the new Occupational Safety
and Health Administration called for its removal. The substance was
used in the construction of the lower floors of the World Trade
Towers, but its use was discontinued as the structures were erected to
their great heights. Had the use of asbestos been continued as
planned, the towers would have been slower to collapse. However,
as a result, the rescuers would have inhaled more of the injurious
fiber and had their lives shortened accordingly.13 Additionally, the
construction workers building the towers would also have had
marginally shortened life expectancies.
Notwithstanding the decline in the use of asbestos, the
premier epidemiological study found that 27.5 million Americans

11. Richard Doll, Mortality from Lung Cancer in Asbestos Workers, 12 BRIT.
J. INDUS. MED. 81 (1997).
12. Approximately 20% of mesothelioma cases are not caused by asbestos
fibers. Michele Carbone et al., The Pathogenesis of Mesothelioma, 29 SEMINARS
ON ONCOLOGY 2, 3-4 (2002).
13. Kaream Fahim, Metro Briefing New York: Ground Zero Worker Dies of
Cancer, N.Y. TIMES, March 17, 2006, at B1 (reporting that a paramedic who
inhaled asbestos fibers on 9/11 died of mesothelioma in March 2006).
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had by 1979 been exposed to the possible risk of inhaling asbestos
fibers.14
B.

Asbestos Litigation, 1972-1991

In 1972, a worker suffering from asbestosis sued a building
materials manufacturer for failure to warn him of the danger
associated with working with the material. 15 The evidence presented
was that the defendant knew that work with asbestos carried risks but
had not disclosed them to the plaintiff. On that evidence, the worker
won a $68,000 jury verdict.16 More and more workers formerly
employed by Johns-Manville, and intermediate distributors of
asbestos such as Babcock & Wilcox, were by then experiencing
harms that may have been caused at least in part by the inhalation of
asbestos fibers. The use of asbestos had been so ubiquitous and the
reactions so long delayed that an afflicted person may have been
exposed to the fibers by any of numerous firms. More claims began
to be filed. The lawyers filing them were invoking the system of
legal risk management that had evolved in the preceding post-war
decades.
During the 1970s, about 950 cases were filed in federal
courts and perhaps twice that many again in state courts.17 The
number of filings in federal courts increased sharply in the early
1980s; from 1980 to 1984 about 10,000 cases were filed in federal
courts, leading one federal court to declare that it was “ill-equipped
to handle this avalanche of litigation.”18 At the time of the utterance,
it was scarcely an avalanche. One also began to hear the term “mass
tort,” a term suited to aviation disasters but perhaps misleading when
applied to a mass of claims each of which is materially different
from the next with respect to the question of causation as well as that
of measuring individual damages.
Most personal injury cases are settled, so that not more than 5
out of 100 asbestos cases could be expected to conclude with a trial

14. William Nicholson et al., Occupational Exposure to Asbestos: Population
at Risk and Projected Mortality 1980-2030, 3 AM. J. INDUS. MED. 259 (1982).
15. Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973).
16. Id.
17. TERRENCE DUNGWORTH, PRODUCT LIABILITY AND THE BUSINESS SECTOR
36 (1988).
18. Jenkins v. Raymark Indus., 782 F.2d 468, 470 (5th Cir. 1986).
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on the merits. The federal caseload in 1984 could have been handled
with less than one additional asbestos trial every five years by each
federal judge. Then, from 1985 to 1989, 37,000 more asbestos cases
were filed. The annual total for 1990 rose to 13,000, a number that
could result in an asbestos trial a year for each federal judge. That
placed a substantial demand on the available resources, but still not
one that it was impossible for the judiciary to bear.
These numbers take no account of the filings in state courts,
which were surely more numerous, although there is no precise
count. By 1991, it was estimated that there were 115,000 asbestos
personal injury claims pending in all American courts, state or
federal.19 This was regarded as an appalling number. But it was
about four cases per trial judge, and given that most personal injury
claims settle before trial on the merits, at least when such trials are
imminent, it was not yet a totally unmanageable flood of litigation.
Although most personal injury claims were settled before
trial, the incentives to settle asbestos cases were magnified by the
complexity of the cases thus presented for decision when the merits
were reached. Each and every individual claim presented a set of
scientific questions bearing on the nature and extent of the plaintiff’s
harm and the relationship of that harm to an exposure to the
inhalation of asbestos fibers. Such scientific issues would need to be
resolved on the basis of testimony by medical and other scientific
experts presented by adversary counsel. It would not be extravagant
to consume several days of trial to educate a jury and/or a trial judge
on the intricacies of the science bearing on any individual claim.
In addition, in each case there was a need to reconstruct
events related to the plaintiff’s alleged exposure to the risk. In most
asbestos cases, those events occurred at least two, and often three or
four, decades prior to the trial at which they were to be
reconstructed. Also in many cases, the plaintiff might have been
exposed to risk at several different times by several different
employers or suppliers. Except in cases brought against JohnsManville, there was also likely to be an issue as to when the
defendant acquired knowledge that asbestos fibers are dangerous to
the health of those working on the defendant’s premises. That issue
often turned on the credibility of testimony of business executives

19. Suzanne L. Oliver & Leslie Spencer, Who Will the Monster Devour
Next?, FORBES MAG., Feb. 18, 1991, at 75.
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denying knowledge.20 And in some cases it might be possible to
prove that the defendant was reckless in failing to disclose the risk,
and might thus be held to additional account. Finally, there was in
each case an issue of damages. How severely, if at all, is the
plaintiff actually disabled? How does the disability affect his or her
life and work? And how should his or her suffering be compensated?
The resolution of the latter issues requires a trier of fact to assess the
veracity of the witnesses, bearing on each individual plaintiff’s
suffering and economic loss.
These difficult factual issues involving the interface of law
and science intersect with uncertainties of substantive law. Can a
firm such as Johns-Manville, that mines and manufactures asbestos,
be held to account for all the harms? Should it be a defense that
millions of Americans were protected by its product? What of a firm
such as Babcock & Wilcox that builds boilers according to
specifications provided by the United States Navy—were they
responsible for knowing of the risk and informing those who worked
with or around their boilers? Is it a defense—or at least a partial
defense—in a lung cancer case, that the plaintiff chose to inhale
cigarette smoke that may have been the primary cause of his
sickness? Or can a tobacco company that sold him cigarettes be
made to pay some or all the costs? Where there are multiple possible
causes of the disability, may liability be apportioned among
numerous defendants, or must the plaintiff prove that the
wrongdoing of a particular defendant is the predominant cause?
What is the liability of a parent corporation for claims against a
subsidiary that were latent at the time the subsidiary was acquired?
What is the applicable statute of limitations, and when should the
period of limitation be deemed to have commenced? Are plaintiffs
entitled to compensation for “pain and suffering” associated with the
fear of illness resulting from the knowledge that their exposure to
asbestos may in the future result in serious illness or death? All
these legal issues are governed by the tort law of each state. In many
states, the questions may have no clear answers or the answers may
depend on the factual circumstances. Moreover, because the states
do not answer the questions in the same way, there is a ubiquitous
conflict of laws issue as to which state law ought be applied to
20. A defense lawyer denotes the resolution of the issue as a “swearing
match.” Richard O. Faulk, Asbestos Litigation in State Courts: Why the System is
Broken and Some Suggestions for Repair, 71 U.S.L.W. 2323, 2323 (2002).
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resolve any of these specific legal questions in a particular individual
case.
Because the factual and legal issues presented were so
complex and their resolutions so difficult to foretell, parties were
especially eager to avoid trials on the merits.21 But even in cases
settled without trial, legal costs were very high because of the
lawyers’ need for access to scientific evidence as a basis for
negotiated settlements. It was unsurprising when a 1982 study
measuring the costs of dispute resolution concluded that for every
dollar reaching an asbestos claimant, $1.59 was paid to lawyers and
medical examiners. The National Association of Manufacturers
would in 2006 plausibly up that estimate to $2.38.22 For smaller
asbestosis claims, the portion actually received was much lower,
while for the larger mesothelioma cases, the portion of the cost paid
by the defendant that was received by the plaintiff was higher.23
If parties were not eager to try these complex cases, the
judiciary was even less inclined to do so. There was growing and
legitimate concern that the outcomes of trials seemed almost random
with similarly situated plaintiffs receiving radically divergent
compensation depending on factors such as (1) the persuasiveness of
particular expert witnesses; (2) the degree of concern of the judge
and jury for the personal tragedy faced by particular plaintiffs; and
(3) differences in the law of the jurisdiction in which the cases were
tried and decided. Asbestosis cases indeed resembled a lottery.
C.

After 1991: Court Management, Delay, and
Resolution en Masse

By the year 2002, 730,000 claims had been filed alleging
personal injuries caused by the use of asbestos.24 Approximately

21. 95.3% of the cases filed were settled before trial, and another 0.9% after
commencement of the trial. JAMES S. KAKALIK ET AL., VARIATIONS IN ASBESTOS
LITIGATION COMPENSATION AND EXPENSES 19 (1984).
22. The Fairness in Asbestos Injury Resolution Act of 2006: Hearing on S.
32774 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 41 (2006) (statement of
John Engler, President, National Association of Manufacturers).
23. KAKALIK ET AL., supra note 21, at 89-91.
24. 150 CONG. REC. S4078 (daily ed. Apr. 19, 2004) (statement of Sen.
Hatch).
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8,400 businesses had been named as defendants in asbestos cases.25
A total of $54 billion had been paid to claimants. In each of the last
three years, over 100,000 additional claims were filed. This has
occurred despite the fact that the usage of asbestos declined
precipitously in the 1970s and was substantially terminated by 1980.
It is estimated that another million claims will be filed and that the
total cost to settle them all will reach $300 billion unless Congress
takes belated action to somehow reduce the costs. 26
To date, fewer than two thousand out of almost a million
asbestos cases have been tried on the merits.27 By 1991, many
courts, dissatisfied with the fact that some plaintiffs were not settling
and were seeking trials, began to insist on settlement. Particularly in
the federal courts, the idea that it was the business of trial judges to
conduct trials—perhaps especially long and puzzling trials—to
decide cases on their merits, gave way to a new professional
morality. The federal judiciary began to practice what was styled as
case management, designed to achieve economy by exercising
tighter judicial control over pretrial proceedings, in the hope of
inducing a higher rate of settlement. Some federal judges came to
regard the conduct of a civil trial not as the core business of their
profession, but as an event marking a professional shortcoming of
the judge. It may also have been a factor in the seemingly special
reluctance of federal judges to decide asbestos cases on the merits
that complex issues of state law were presented, issues that federal
courts were not commissioned to resolve. It may also have mattered
that the product was off the market, so that no decision of any court
could be expected to impact others than the parties themselves.
For all these reasons, it became increasingly difficult in many
federal courts to get an individual asbestos case to trial. While most
asbestos plaintiffs were not eager to go to trial, they did need a firm
trial date to induce defendants to settle their claims. Lawyers
representing plaintiffs therefore began to contrive to keep their cases
in state courts and out of federal courts. This was emphatically so
after 1991 when all the cases pending in federal courts were

25. 150 CONG. REC. S4080 (daily ed. Apr. 19, 2004) (statement of Sen.
Hatch).
26. STEPHEN J. CARROLL ET AL., ASBESTOS LITIGATION COSTS AND
COMPENSATION: AN INTERIM REPORT (2002).
27. CARROLL ET AL., supra note 26, at 56.
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consolidated before a single judge.28 Such a consolidation was
authorized for the purpose of conducting more efficient pretrial
proceedings.29 Given that most of the scientific evidence would be
specific to an individual case, it was at best unlikely that a single
transferee judge could materially diminish the cost or the delay
associated with pretrial preparation of an asbestos case. While the
federal judges ordering the transfers may have thought otherwise at
the time, the transferee judge had no authority to conduct a mass
trial,30 even if that were imaginable.
At that time in 1991, it was reported by one observer that the
backlogs in federal courts would not get to trial for decades.
Another found that if asbestos cases were individually tried, it would
require 150 years to decide them all.31 While these forecasts were
extreme exaggerations, there was no doubt that the single transferee
judge was not expected to decide any of the cases on the merits.
Additional facilities would be needed if these complex cases were
each to be individually tried, if ever they were to be tried.32
Meanwhile, asbestos claims pending in federal court were on
permanent hold. The transferee forum was merely a place for
asbestos cases to languish.
Similar dilatory devices were employed by the courts of
many states whose judges likewise sought to avoid deciding the
cases on their individual merits. Many judges were especially slow
to put asbestos cases on the docket for trial.
But when it was at last discerned that some defendants were
exploiting the delay by refusing settlements until cases were set for
trial (which was apparently forever), more than a few state court
judges began consolidating asbestos cases for common trial. If
trying one asbestos case was almost too much to ask of lawyers,
judges, and jurors, what could be said for trying six or a dozen cases
simultaneously in a single continuous hearing? This was a device
for terrorizing recalcitrant defendants and it resulted in some very
28. In re Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig. (No. VI), 771 F. Supp. 415, 422-424
(J.P.M.L. 1991).
29. 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2000).
30. Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26, 28
(1998).
31. JACK B. WEINSTEIN, INDIVIDUAL JUSTICE IN MASS TORT LITIGATION 140
(1995).
32. Paul F. Rothstein, What Courts Can Do in the Face of the Never-Ending
Asbestos Crisis, 71 MISS. L.J. 1 (2001).
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generous settlement offers. The generosity of these settlements, on
the basis of limited examination of their merits conducted in the
settlement process, had the effect of drawing more plaintiffs into the
pool of claimants.33 This device of coercive judicial consolidation
was forsaken by many courts.34 The Supreme Court of West
Virginia in 2001 allowed a trial judge in that state to consolidate
twelve thousand asbestos claims for a single trial, an event that
obviously cannot happen, but which is a sufficiently appalling
prospect to force settlements not based on scrutiny of the merits of
the individual claims.35 A secondary consequence of this device is to
concentrate the filing of claims in those jurisdictions employing it.
Claimants who filed their claims in West Virginia seemed likely to
be compensated more generously than those who were so poorly
advised that they filed their claims in a forum in which their case
might actually come to trial.

II.

LEGISLATION CONSIDERED

Numerous schemes were advanced to relieve the problem of
docket congestion by federal legislation. Most envisioned some kind
of administrative agency that would devise a formula for evenhanded management of the claims.36 Such an agency or facility
might resemble the industrial accident compensation boards sitting in
many states to hear and decide a range of similar matters. Its judges
might be expected to acquire a measure of expertise about the
science employed to resolve the issues of fact raised regarding
causation and damages. It might be directed and empowered to
categorize the cases so that like cases would receive like treatment.
But hearings to consider such legislative reforms led nowhere,37 as
Congress lacked the will to impose any solution on the problem.
One reason was that Corporate America was unable itself to agree on
33. See generally Edward H. Cooper, Aggregation and Settlement of Mass
Torts, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1943 (2000) (discussing mass torts and class actions).
34. See Francis E. McGovern, An Analysis of Mass Tort for Judges, 73 TEX.
L. REV. 1821, 1838-41 (1995) (discussing judicial approaches to mass torts).
35. The Supreme Court of the United States declined to review this decision.
Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Ayers, 538 U.S. 135 (2003).
36. See Brickman, supra note 9, at 189 (advocating administrative remedy).
37. The Fairness in Asbestos Compensation Act, H.R. 1283, 106th Cong.
(1999).
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a solution. Another was that plaintiffs’ lawyers were likewise
divided. There were those with clients suffering grave mesothelioma
and those suffering minor respiratory impediments. There were those
whose clients’ sicknesses were manifest and immediate and those
whose clients’ injuries consisted of symptoms indicative of the
possibility of future suffering and disability and, finally, those who
sought compensation for the fear that they would suffer in the
future.38 A third reason for the impasse was the blindness of
Congress to the responsibility of the public to bear a substantial part
of the blame and the cost.
In 2005, the Fairness in Asbestos Injury Resolution Act was
approved by the Senate Judiciary Committee. The bill would have
established a $140 billion National Asbestos Trust Fund, managed
by an Office of Asbestos Disease Compensation within the
Department of Labor, with fixed levels of compensation for different
categories of asbestos victims.39 The fund if established would have
been assembled from diverse bankrupt estates supplemented by
annual contributions from firms and insurers facing liabilities. In
return, contributors would have been exempt from further claims.
The Director of the Congressional Budget Office expressed doubt
that the fund was adequate to meet the obligations undertaken and
forecast that the government would end up holding the bag.40
Economist Charles Bates predicted that the future claims on the fund
would equal $300 billion.41 The difficulty of forecasting the future
caseload was manifest. The bill did not pass the Senate.
Other schemes for resolving the asbestos crisis were also
proposed. Senator Nickles called for reforming the federal law to
limit the number of asbestos claims. His proposal would have
imposed strict medical criteria whereby a person would have to
38. Geoffrey Hazard, The Futures Problem, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1901, 1996
(2000). Hazard suggests a legislative solution to the problem. Id. at 1916. Other
comments on the issue include Linda Mullenix, Back to the Futures: Privatizing
Future Claims Resolution, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1919 (2000) and Diane Wood,
Commentary on the Futures Problem, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1933 (2000).
39. Recent Developments in Assessing Future Asbestos Claims under the Fair
Act: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 1 (2005)
(statement of Sen. Specter, Member, Senate Comm. on the Judiciary).
40. Id. at 115.
41. Recent Developments in Assessing Future Asbestos Claims under the Fair
Act: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 115-17 (2005)
(statement of Sen. Specter, Member, Senate Comm. on the Judiciary).
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prove asbestos related injuries before filing a claim. Imposing strict
medical criteria might or might not reduce the number of claims, but
splitting the trials would spare courts the need to hear proof of
damages in cases in which it was determined that there was no
compensable injury. Additionally, his proposal would toll the statute
of limitations to protect the rights of people who exhibit signs of
asbestos-related disease but develop illnesses in the future.42
Alternatively, his proposal advocated nationalizing Texas’ scheme of
establishing inactive dockets: all asbestos related claims would be
relegated to inactive dockets and shifted to an active docket only
after a claim is certified to involve an asbestos related illness
according to established medical criteria.43 However, because of the
ever-present political differences in Congress, these solutions,
whatever their merit or demerit, have remained unavailable on a
national scale.
Variations on the Texas scheme have been enacted in other
states. They have served to reduce the number of claims, at least for
the moment. In 2006, Senator Specter sought to revive the FAIR Act
aimed at securing the support of those concerned about the cost of
paying claims that are premature in the sense that the claimant is not
yet physically disabled but is concerned about his or her future
prospects of health.44 His draft would defer consideration of their
claims until there is a certified disability, somewhat in the manner of
the laws enacted in Texas and other states. Still, insurers were
concerned that some claimants might be “double-dipping” by
making claims on workmen’s compensation funds for the same
injuries compensated by the trust fund.45 Eric Green, testifying as an
expert on alternative dispute resolution mechanisms established by
bankruptcy courts, affirmed that that system was working reasonably
well. He noted that the Halliburton Company had gone through the
bankruptcy process and then prospered, so that it—in the end—paid

42. 150 CONG. REC. S4258 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 2004) (statement of Sen.
Nickles).
43. George Scott Christian & Dale Craymer, Texas Asbestos Litigation
Reform: A Model for the States, 44 S. TEX. L. REV. 981, 999-1000 (2003).
44. The Fairness in Asbestos Injury Resolution Act of 2006, S. 3274, 109th
Cong. (2006).
45. The Fairness in Asbestos Injury Resolution Act of 2006: Hearing Before
the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 82 (2006) (statement of Edmond F.
Kelly, Chairman, Liberty Mutual Ins. Co.).
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off all claims in full for the amounts set in the bankruptcy
proceeding.46
No serious consideration has been given to any proposal to
impose any of these costs on federal taxpayers. This is so even
though the asbestos problem bore a resemblance to the Black Lung
Disease experienced by coal miners. The United States had
undertaken to fund care for those afflicted with that illness.47 The
black lung problem was much smaller in scale and it was
immediately obvious that the coal companies could not bear the cost.
Perhaps these differences explain the inability of Congress to accept
even partial financial responsibility for the disaster so that the loss
might be distributed to those who have benefited from the use of
asbestos.

III.

SOLUTIONS DEVISED BY JUDGES AND PARTIES

Meanwhile, courts and parties, left largely to their own
devices by Congress for thirty years, sought to fashion systems for
mass resolution of these diverse individual claims. The West
Virginia case previously referred to was a parody of other forms of
aggregation. The first of these aggregative responses was the filing
of a petition in bankruptcy by the Johns-Manville Corp. As noted,
there was evidence that Manville executives had some knowledge of
the risks that they had not shared with the public, and they were in
fact the producers of most of the material used in the United States.
And most of the cases filed before 1982 were filed against the JohnsManville Company.48 It was that year that Manville filed its
bankruptcy petition. Accordingly, all asbestos claims then pending
against it were stayed. The viable assets of the firm (including the
trade name) were sold and the proceeds placed in trust for the
46. The Fairness in Asbestos Injury Resolution Act of 2006: Hearing Before
the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 82 (2006) (statement of Eric Green,
Founder, Principle, Resolution, LLC).
47. See ALAN DERICKSON, BLACK LUNG: ANATOMY OF A PUBLIC HEALTH
DISASTER 143-182 (1998) (describing the process by which coal miners afflicted
with black lung disease obtained public benefits).
48. Lester Brickman, The Asbestos Claims Management Act of 1991: A
Proposal to the United States Congress, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 1891, 1894 n.13
(1992); see also Kane v. Johns-Manville Corp., 843 F.2d 639 (2d Cir. 1988)
(discussing high number of suits to which Manville had been a party).
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claimants, those with pending claims and those anticipated in the
future.49 The firm thus remained in business while its ownership
changed. It was envisioned that the trust would settle individual
claims in accordance with a formula established by it with the
approval of the court.
This was a radical solution. Most corporate executives
understandably dread bankruptcy. It is, however, now often the
result that an enterprise will survive bankruptcy in a reorganized
form, as did Johns-Manville, and that management will survive even
while the shareholders’ interests are wiped clean. So far as appears,
no managers have been the object of shareholders’ derivative suits
for their failures to protect shareholders from liability for asbestos
claims, although if management was truly negligent, it would seem
that the managers should not be allowed to pass all the loss on to the
ill-served shareholders.
Many of the firms in bankruptcy as a result of asbestos
claims remain, like Johns-Manville, profitable while the bankruptcy
stops claimants dead in their tracks, at least while it is determined
that there is a net worth to be divided among them. As Eric Green
observed, some like Halliburton have managed to revive and pay off
all claims in full.50 Never mind the former shareholders.
Similar aggregation could also be achieved outside
bankruptcy by means of cooperation among plaintiffs’ lawyers.
Asbestos cases are likely to be referred from the lawyer having a
direct relationship with a plaintiff to another lawyer who specializes
in the settlement of asbestos cases. The lawyer or lawyers to whom
the cases are referred can then speak of an inventory of claims that
can be simultaneously presented to the defendant and settled
together. In the 1980s, lawyers representing plaintiffs discovered
that corporate managements could be intimidated into more
favorable settlements if their claims could be aggregated so that
settlement conversations would center on sums of such magnitude
that they might affect the market value of shares.51 A problem with
49. MacArthur Co. v. Johns-Manville, 837 F.2d 89, 89 (2d Cir. 1988).
50. The Fairness in Asbestos Injury Resolution Act of 2006: Hearing Before
the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 82 (2006) (statement of Edmond F.
Kelly, Chairman, Liberty Mutual Ins. Co.).
51. DEBORAH HENSLER ET AL., ASBESTOS IN THE COURTS: THE CHALLENGE
OF MASS TOXIC TORT LITIGATION (1985); Deborah Hensler, As Time Goes By:
Asbestos Litigation After Amchem and Ortiz, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1899, 1912-13
(2002). This affect had been earlier discovered by antitrust lawyers, leading one
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these settlements en masse was that they did not always prescribe the
amount to be received by each member of the lawyer’s inventory of
plaintiffs. Thus, either the lawyer had to divide the take among his
or her clients, a task presenting a direct conflict of interest, or some
form of alternative dispute resolution was needed to make the
division, thereby transferring the cost of defending claims from the
defendant to the plaintiffs collectively. “Claims facilities” relieved
judges and defendants’ lawyers of workloads and their tasks were
performed by other lawyers whose services were not necessarily less
costly. Alternatively, in some cases a “reverse auction” occurred,
pitting plaintiffs’ lawyers in competitive bidding to be the lawyer
who settles a mass of cases and shares in the proceeds.52 In all its
forms, aggregation complicates the ethical responsibilities of
plaintiffs’ lawyers.53
A disincentive to business management considering such a
deal has been the prospect that future claimants, whose numbers are
unknown, would demand treatment equal to that afforded in the
previous settlement. Managers hoped for global peace that would
bring closure to their liability for asbestos claims and enable their
firms to concentrate on the future rather than the distant past. Not
only does global peace serve the interest of long-term investors, but
it is also favored by investment managers who are acutely sensitive
to swings in the prices of shares in which they have invested. And it
is especially remunerative to corporate managers who make the
settlement decisions if they are compensated, as most are, with
options to purchase shares in the companies that can be sold at a
profit only if the share price rises in the short term.
observer to denote the practice as “legalized blackmail.” Milton Handler, The Shift
from Substantive to Procedural Innovations in Antitrust Suits, 71 COLUM. L. REV.
1, 9 (1971).
52. The device is explained more fully by Justin Scheck, The Gritty World of
the Reverse Auction Spreads, NAT’L L.J., July 25, 2005, at 11.
53. See generally Carrie Menkel Meadow, Ethics of the Settlement of Mass
Torts: When the Rules Meet the Road, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1159 (1995) (arguing
that the ethical complications of their settlements demand changes in the legal
system beyond professional ethics rules); Charles Silver & Lynn Baker, I Cut, You
Choose: The Role of Plaintiff’s Counsel in Allocating Settlement Proceeds, 84 VA.
L. REV. 1465 (1998) (exploring differences between the rules governing the
settlement process for consensual and non-consensual litigation groups); Lester
Brickman, Lawyers’ Ethics and Fiduciary Obligation in the Brave New World of
Aggregative Litigation, 26 WM. & MARY ENV. L. & POL’Y REV. 243 (2001)
(attacking “perverse” financial incentives of lawyers in aggregate litigation).
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This is so, in part, because global peace facilitates use of an
accounting principle that allows separate measurement of “trailing
income” against future income. Because accountants have learned
this not so subtle distinction, the costs of global settlements can be
charged against past income to show that the business was less
profitable in the past than was thought by earlier investors, but the
future income is more secure as projected. That results in keeping
the share prices high. If cases are settled one at a time, the liability
remains a drag on future income and share prices fall. This is a
consequence directly affecting the personal wealth of corporate
managers who are paid with stock options entitling them to buy
shares in the not-too-distant future at today’s price, with the gain to
be taxed at the lower rates applied to capital gains.
Perhaps for these reasons, Congress has, with a gentle touch
of public generosity, added incentives favoring such settlements by
their treatment for tax purposes. The Internal Revenue Code permits
defendants who make payments into a settlement fund to deduct
them at the time of the fund’s establishment rather than when (or if)
funds are distributed to claimants.54 Other provisions assure
favorable treatment to those who buy and sell (factor) “structured
settlements,” which involve a series of payments rather than a lump
sum to an injured party.55
To facilitate global settlements bringing the global peace for
which managers were willing to pay premium prices while avoiding
the complexities of bankruptcy proceedings, creative lawyers and
judges fashioned the limited-fund class action.56 This was primarily
a defensive use of a device designed for the benefit of plaintiffs.57
The corporate defendant reached agreements with plaintiff’s counsel
on the size of the fund that it could afford to provide and then

54. See generally Richard B. Risk, Jr., A Case for the Urgent Need to Clarify
Tax Treatment of a Qualified Settlement Fund Created for a Single Claimant, 23
VA. TAX REV. 639 (2004) (arguing that Congress did not intend for the judicial
doctrine of economic benefit to apply to a designated or qualified settlement fund
created for the benefit of a single claimant).
55. See Adam F. Scales, Against Settlement Factoring? The Market in Tort
Claims Has Arrived 4 WIS. L. REV. 859, 882 (2002) (“[D]efendants save
approximately 20-25% by settling with a structure rather than a lump-sum.”).
56. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2) was invoked.
57. Francis E. McGovern, The Defensive Use of Federal Class Actions in
Mass Torts, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 595 (1997).
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established a trust similar to that created by the bankruptcy court.58
Two such schemes reached the Supreme Court of the United States
and were set aside for failure to provide adequate protection of
individual claimants who did not consent to them, especially future
claimants whom the parties sought to bind to a judgment of the court
that would afford the defendant “global peace” against future
claims.59 In the latter of these cases, the Court accurately observed
that American courts have been besieged by an “elephantine mass of
asbestos cases [that] defies customary judicial administration.” That
observation was reiterated by the Court in 2003.60
When the limited fund class action encountered these
obstacles, the experts returned to the law of bankruptcy for solace.
Congress had, in 1994, taken action explicitly to authorize the
bankruptcy court to protect the reorganized firm from future
claimants, provided it made arrangements to treat future claimants on
equal terms with prior claimants.61 To provide equal treatment, the
bankruptcy court needed a means of measuring future claims,
something the Manville Trust and others had been unable to find,
given the enormous diversity in the physical conditions of the
claimants.62 Modern science has simply not been up to that task.
Partial payments were made to present claims, but it then appeared
that the number of future claims had been grossly underestimated.
Perhaps this should not have been surprising, given that at least 27
million Americans had been exposed, and a significant percentage
had a physical symptom that might have been associated with
exposure at some time past, a symptom that might entitle them to a
measure of compensation now, while more accurately assessed
compensation would be later barred by the bankruptcy decree.
58. For an account, see Francis E. McGovern, Claims Resolution Facilities
and the Mass Settlement of Mass Tort, 52 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 61 (1990).
59. Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815 (1999); Amchem Prods., Inc. v.
Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997). A novel approach to the future claims problem
was approved by the district court In re Diet Drugs; the approach called for
conferring on each member of the class a right resembling the “put option”
familiar to investment traders and entitled the class member to invoke a right to
treatment or compensation at a future time. In re Diet Drugs, 2000 U.S. Dist.
Lexis 12275 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 28, 2000).
60. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 538 U.S. at 166; cf. Metro N. Commuter R.R. v.
Buckley, 521 U.S. 424 (1997).
61. 11 U.S.C. § 524(g) (2000).
62. Thomas A. Smith, A Capital Markets Approach to Mass Tort Bankruptcy,
104 YALE L.J. 367, 382-391 (1994).
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Notwithstanding these problems, sixteen large corporations had filed
bankruptcy petitions by 2000 and scores more followed. Most
remain in business and many prosper for the benefit of claimants
rather than shareholders.
To protect their members whose claims were threatened with
foreclosure before they were ripe, labor unions and some lawyers
began engaging in aggressive claim solicitation campaigns designed
to multiply the number of filed cases, thereby increasing the pressure
on defendants to settle cases wholesale.63 Once a person was
informed of the presence of pleural plaque, a condition that is itself
inconsequential, he or she was effectively informed of the injury and
was obliged under the law of most states to file a claim or else be
barred from filing when and if the injury became consequential. As
noted, some states have sought to solve this problem by creating
registries on which individuals having such a condition could be
listed, with the effect that they would not be barred by the statute of
limitations if they were later physically disabled by the condition.64
In the 1990s, an increasing percentage of the claims filed
were presented by workers who had not been employed in any of the
industries in which asbestos exposure was severe.65 Their exposures
to the inhalation of fibers were more limited. For example, some
encountered asbestos only as an ingredient in the ceiling tiles at their
place of employment, which might have been a local grocery store.
Because the severity of the injury is related to the degree of
exposure, these claims are even less likely to represent real future
injuries, but science cannot say for sure in any individual case. Also,
because the law of most states allows plaintiffs to recover for mental
anguish associated with physical injury, many plaintiffs with mild
cases of asbestosis that are not at all debilitating may be entitled to
compensation for the mental anguish resulting from the fear that a
cancer may develop at some future time. The Supreme Court has
now applied that principle to railroad workers seeking compensation
under the federal law governing their rights.66 The result of these
holdings is that thousands of plaintiffs with slight or even nonexistent injuries advance claims that compete with the claims of
63. Peter H. Schuck, The Worst Should Go First: Deferral Registries in
Asbestos Litigation, 15 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 541, 564 (1992).
64. CARROLL ET AL., supra note 26, at 23.
65. CARROLL ET AL., supra note 26, at 46.
66. Norfolk & W. Ry Co., 538 U.S. at 166.
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plaintiffs having serious injuries in the distribution of the assets of
the many firms made insolvent by their liabilities for asbestos
injuries.67 It is this problem that the state laws referred to seek to
address.
Indeed, a new industry emerged to advertise its willingness to
tell people whether they might have million dollar lungs; litigationscreening companies compete with mobile x-ray vans that offer free
chest x-rays to anyone willing to sign an agreement retaining a
lawyer with whom the screening company has a relation.68 If a
symptom is detected, the “patient” is informed and a claim is
advanced to secure compensation for the emotional injury associated
with the non-debilitating condition that might ripen into an illness.
Such claims become valuable when they are aggregated in sufficient
numbers to intimidate management.
The adjudication of future claims as envisioned by the 1994
revision of the bankruptcy law engages the bankruptcy court, like the
class action trustee, in the sublime task of compensating victims for
the enlarged chances that they may develop serious illnesses at some
indeterminate future time. This is essentially a task of risk
assessment of the sort the insurance industry rather than a law court
is usually employed to perform. But insurance companies are not
lined up in hope of securing that employment.
Can courts reckon the odds as well or better than insurance
companies? Of course, many firms have long ago purchased liability
insurance to protect them against such future claims. Unfortunately,
the risks were seldom if ever accurately assessed. As noted, the
number of claims was vastly underestimated. As a result, many
firms that used asbestos in one way or another were underinsured. A
recent estimate is that insurers will ultimately bear about sixty
percent of the loss; that share will be equally divided between
American insurers and non-U.S. insurers.69 And some insurance
companies are themselves facing risks of insolvency.
67. Francis McGovern, The Tragedy of the Asbestos Commons, 88 VA. L.
REV. 1721 (2002); see also Roger Parloff, Infinite Liability, AM. LAW. 178 (Oct.
2002); Lawyers Catch Asbestosis, AM. LAW. 170 (April 2002).
68. Robert J. Samuelson, Asbestos Fraud, WASH. POST, Nov. 20, 2002, at
A25. See WALTER K. OLSON, THE RULE OF LAWYERS: HOW THE NEW LITIGATION
ELITE THREATENS AMERICA’S RULE OF LAW 181-208 (2003) (indicting the
plaintiffs’ lawyers).
69. Bob Van Voris, Asbestos Suits: No End in Sight, NAT’L L.J., Aug. 27,
2001.
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Another troubling question raised by Peter Schuck is
whether, when a bankrupt estate is not adequate to meet all claims,
funds should be paid to those not injured, but who might be, at the
expense of those who have been gravely injured.70 The Act under
consideration in 2005 would assure those gravely injured of
compensation, but those whose injuries are not yet consequential
may be at risk if $140 billion is spent before his or her claim ripens.

IV.

SOME LESSONS TO BE DERIVED

There are several lessons to be learned from this tragic tale.
First, it is unlikely that many readers could disagree with the
observation of the Supreme Court that the asbestos problem cried out
for a legislated solution.
Such a solution should have been
forthcoming in 1970, and the United States should have borne much
or all of the cost. The American policy of making business pay for
the consequences of its innate indifference to the welfare of workers
and consumers, may be a good idea in general—as a means of
encouraging safer practices—but it was not a policy that could be
usefully pursued with respect to asbestos. By the time the courts
were involved, the use of asbestos was already in decline and did not
need to be discouraged. Moreover, the alleged transgressions of
business were in this instance motivated by the competing purpose to
prevent harms caused by fire. And many of the users of asbestos
were substantially innocent of full knowledge of the risks for which
they are asked to pay. The responsibility was a public responsibility,
not one rightly imposed on business. Both Congress and the
Executive Branch flunked that test.
Second, we ought to agree that premature adjudication is not
a satisfactory form of litigation. As has long been understood, there
is a time to decide a case. A court established to apply law to facts
cannot consistently with that mission measure and compensate harms
before they have matured into real injuries with symptoms that can
be examined and resulting disabilities that can be reasonably
evaluated as to their extent and cause. Courts engaging in that
practice are just guessing and hence failing to protect their integrity
as institutions of law. Although a claim for compensation for the

70. Schuck, supra note 63, at 560-67.
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anxiety caused by knowledge of increased risk of future harm can be
said to present a case or controversy within the meaning of Article
III of the Constitution of the United States,71 the longstanding
judicial reluctance to resolve hypothetical cases72 is rooted in
considerations that are not irrelevant to cases in which courts are
asked to guess about future cases. It follows that global peace in
many, and perhaps most, mass tort cases of the asbestos sort is not a
goal that can be prudently pursued by a court of law, however
attractive that objective may be to accountants and executives.
Whatever its limitations, the insurance industry, not the courthouse,
is the place to look for global peace.
Third, we might learn from this experience the risks of the
fashion presently prevalent in the federal courts that treats
dispositions of disputes on their merits as professional failures by the
judges. In asbestos cases, case management has diminished the
threat that an imminent trial on the merits poses to parties with weak
claims or defenses and thereby has encouraged their assertion. The
evidence thus supports Judith Resnik’s insistence that it is not the
work of a judge to coerce parties either by imposing endless delay on
the plaintiff or unmanageable aggregation on the defendant.73 While
it does appear that there are now too many asbestos claims to resolve
each on its merits in a court of law, this was far from apparent at the
time that extraordinary measures were being taken to avoid trying
the cases on the merits. One is left to wonder how the march of
events might have differed if each asbestos claim advanced in the
1980s had been given a prompt hearing and decision on the merits as
each of them reached the top of its calendar. Most of the cases
would have been timely, if expensively, settled as the parties
squarely faced the risks and costs of having to prove their claims or
defenses. Also we cannot know how many claims would not have
been pursued by lawyers or clients if they were given reason to
foresee a risk that their allegations would be rigorously tested on the
merits. Those decrying the willingness of trial lawyers to represent

71. See also Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227 (1937) (upholding
the Declaratory Judgment Act).
72. E.g., Hayburn’s Case, 2 U.S. 409 (1792).
73. Judith Resnik, Trial as Error, Jurisdiction as Injury: Transforming the
Meaning of Article III, 113 HARV. L. REV. 924 (2000); Judith Resnick Mediating
Preferences: Litigant Preferences for Process and Judicial Preferences for
Settlement, 2002 J. DISP. RES. 155 (2002).
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claimants speculating that their lungs might prove to be worth a
million dollars seldom observe the relation between those claims and
the inaccessibility of a trial on the merits.
Fourth, we might fairly conclude that individual claims
arising from exposure to asbestos, however ripe for adjudication, are
simply too complex to be suited to adjudication by law courts.
Institutions committed to making decisions that are “just, speedy,
and inexpensive”74 should not, if there is an alternative, be employed
to resolve very complex scientific issues, nor asked to reconstruct
decade-old events that seemed insignificant at the time to those who
experienced them. The costs and the secondary consequences of
such litigation are excessive. American courts do such things but
only when there is no alternative and the enforcement of the law
requires them. In the asbestos cases, they were called on to decide a
superabundance of such matters. As noted, a special tribunal more
like the industrial accident boards established in the early years of
the 20th century existed as an alternative. While such institutions
have their faults, they are a means of reducing costs and delay in
these complex cases, and of assuring a greater measure of evenhandedness. This is so because administrators deciding such matters
acquire a measure of expertise reducing their need to be educated
repeatedly and at length on the complex issues of medical science.
They would, therefore, have a much better shot of achieving the
appropriate aims of civil litigation than judges and juries.
Indeed, the presence of asbestos claims has likely contributed
to a regrettable decline in the willingness and ability of American
courts to address the merits of claims by providing a paradigm of
cases in which addressing the merits is obviously a waste of scarce
judicial resources. At least in federal courts, it is hard to get any case
to trial, or to get a hearing on appeal.75 Our courts are increasingly
conducted as bureaucracies striving to avoid personal responsibility
for decisions on the merits. There are, of course, other causes
contributing to this unfortunate result, but the asbestos crisis is
among them.

74. As promised by FED. R. CIV. P. 1.
75

See, e.g. Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials
and Related Matters in State and Federal Courts, 1 J. Empirical Legal Stud. 459
(2004) (“The portion of federal civil cases resolved by trial fell from 11.5 percent
in 1962 to 1.8 percent in 2002, continuing a long historic decline.”)
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THE LARGER QUESTION: IS LITIGATION THE RIGHT WAY TO
ALLOCATE THE COSTS OF HEALTH CARE AND PHYSICAL
DISABILITIES?

Although the asbestos crisis is extraordinary, none of the
problems identified in this article are unique to that form of
litigation.
The crisis is, however, a stunning revelation of
shortcomings in American government having deep roots and widely
radiating consequences. The shortcomings are associated with two
broad and exceptional policies whose connection is infrequently
observed. One exceptional policy is America’s unique reliance on
the “blame game” of tort law as a primary method of regulating
business to protect the safety of workers and consumers by imposing
ex post liability sufficient to deter heedlessness of risks. The other
exceptional policy is America’s extraordinary refusal to redistribute
any of the costs and consequences of most personal injuries.
Those who have been most alert to the pertinent
shortcomings of the “blame game” have been the advocates of socalled “tort reform” intended to shield business from claims of
diverse sorts. Tort reform advocates seldom acknowledge a need for
alternative methods of regulating business to correct the innate
indifference of large business management to the health and safety of
remote workers and consumers, an indifference noted in the 18th
century by no less an observer than Adam Smith.76 I have had
several occasions in recent years to debate tort reformers. It has
been my habit to ask whether they were willing to submit to more
vigorous ex ante administrative regulation of business decisions to
prevent heedless risk-taking, regulation such as business is likely to
experience in some other “developed” nations.77 I have never heard
76. After reflecting on accidents befalling distant others, “he would pursue
his business or his pleasure, take his repose or his diversion, with the same ease
and tranquility as if no such accident had happened.” ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY
OF MORAL SENTIMENTS 157 (Oxford ed. 1976) (1759).
77. Of course, some risks are regulated ex ante by the Food and Drug
Administration and by a few other agencies of government. This has recently led
to the effort of tort reformers to invoke the doctrine of federal preemption against
state tort law, thereby precluding the allegedly redundant regulation ex post
provided by tort law. Robert Pear, In a Shift, Bush Moves to Block Medical Suits,
N. Y. TIMES, July 26, 2005, at A1. The American Law Institute recently
reconsidered the issue and supports the contrary provision. RESTATEMENT
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an affirmative answer to that question. Tort reformers seek freedom
to take risks with the consequence that persons other than themselves
will be harmed.
Nor does it seem that most tort reformers are much concerned
about the unavailability of health care to accident victims who may
be able to acquire it, if at all, only by blaming someone with a deeper
pocket. The asbestos crisis ought to suggest to them the possible
wisdom of seeking health care reform as a means of achieving a tort
reform objective.78 Although the effects of the asbestos problem on
the insurance industry are transnational, the courts of no other nation
have experienced a similar asbestos crisis. This is not only because
no other “developed” nation relies so heavily on tort law to provide
ex post regulation of business risk taking, but it is also surely in part
because other developed nations more freely redistribute the cost of
accidents through public health care and disability programs, thus
relieving the social and political pressures that produced the tort law
of the United States.
The major advantage of public health care and disability
insurance is that a single payer of all costs is unconcerned with
causation or blame. Victims must prove their injuries to the
satisfaction of a bureaucracy, but they need not pursue the intricate
and subtle issues of cause and blame that have produced the asbestos
crisis. With a fully developed single-payer system in the United
States, most injured persons would have no need for legal services to
secure conventional health care or replacement for modest lost
earnings. Damages to be assessed in courts would as a result be
(THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 4(b) (1997). A plausible case can be
made for preemption if the regulatory agency has been fully informed of the risks,
leaving it to private lawyers representing tort claimants to investigate whether full
disclosure has been made. See, e.g., Richard B. Stewart, Regulatory Compliance
Preclusion of Tort Liability: Limiting the Dual-Track System, 88 GEO. L.J. 2167
(2000) (summarizing and discussing the American Law Institute Reporter’s Study
on Enterprise Responsibility for Personal Injury). Even if full disclosure is made,
however, there is the serious problem that the regulatory agency itself may
knowingly have concurred in allowing a risk to some citizens in order to diminish
a greater risk to others; Robert L. Rabin, Reassessing Regulatory Compliance, 88
GEO. L.J. 2049 (2000) (discussing “the proper role of regulatory compliance as a
strategy for constraining the traditional functions of tort law.”).
78. Perhaps the issue is especially pertinent to the regulated risk-taking that
deliberately incurs small risks to diminish larger ones. Those spared the larger
risks should compensate those on whom the smaller risks are imposed, but that is
not the way regulation works in America.
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greatly reduced.79 As in other developed nations, only those
plaintiffs with substantial lost earnings or extraordinary health care
needs would have claims worth pursuing in court. It seems almost
certain that compensation for pain and suffering would decline when
triers of fact have no concern for assuring that the special damages
are fully paid without need to share the proceeds with a lawyer.80
Although more injured persons would receive care and support, few
would have to share their compensation with lawyers. With fewer
tort claimants seeking less compensation, defendants would also
experience reduced legal expenses. Whereas it may now cost a total
of $3.38 to put $1.00 in the hands of an asbestos victim,81 it would
be reasonable to expect that such cost could be greatly reduced.82
Independent of the legal costs saved by a single-payer
system, one might also reasonably expect to reduce noticeably the
cost of delivery of health care services. Much of the costly health
care and accident insurance industries could be expected to disappear
as their services would be needed only by persons desiring
extraordinary health care or insurance against the loss of substantial
incomes. Most businesses might expect to cease providing health
care as a fringe benefit, thereby simplifying personnel management.
These savings might be offset, possibly more than offset, by
the cost of providing health care and disability insurance to citizens
to whom such benefits are not presently available. Persons with
respiratory disorders would receive care even if they had no one to
blame for their condition and no health insurance. Businesses and
individuals able to do so might have to pay higher taxes to enable
government to bear that cost. Whether the added tax burden would
79. At least this would be so if the collateral source rule on damages were
made inapplicable, as seems entirely appropriate if the injured plaintiff had
acquired the right to the benefits received without sacrifice on his or her part.
80. Indeed, the availability of single-payer health care might justify
legislative reconsideration of the measures of damages in personal injury cases.
81. If the calculation of the National Association of Manufacturers is correct.
See Statement of Engler, supra note 22.
82. For comparison, the overhead cost of the Social Security Administration
is less than three percent. See Social Security Budget-2005 Budget Request,
http://www.ssa.gov/budget/2005bud.html.
Overhead on Medicare is only
marginally higher. A single payer system would have responsibility for quality
and cost controls that make none of the available comparisons apposite. But a
single payer system’s tasks would be infinitely simpler than those being performed
by health care providers and insurers who are competing in a market of
uninformed consumers and striving to avoid as many obligations as possible.

Summer 2007]

ASBESTOS LESSONS

611

exceed the numerous savings incurred is not a prediction I am
prepared to make. Would it be seriously objectionable to redistribute
the cost of health care for those to whom it is presently unavailable,
as many nations do? I leave the reader to answer that question with
no more help than to say that the question is ripe for
reconsideration.83
Those reformers who are inclined to dismantle our system of
ex post business regulation should at least acknowledge not only the
deregulatory implications of tort reform, but its secondary
consequences in placing added reliance on a health care system that
already fails to attend the needs of millions of citizens.

VI.

CONCLUSION

America’s experience with asbestos litigation should teach us
to appreciate both the merits and the limits of our system of ex post
regulation of business. The civil trial is an important social and
political institution on which the public depends for the protection of
consumers, workers, and the environment. Even Corporate America
cannot long do without it. But civil courts are not a system and
cannot be made into a system fit to deal with individual matters as
monstrously complex as the scientific issues to be resolved in
asbestos cases. Nor can courts usefully try cases before they arise;
premature resolution invites the filing of dubious claims. If
legislatures insist on leaving such proliferations of complex disputes
for the courts, they should be expected to provide enough judges,
courtrooms, and juries to timely resolve disputes on their merits for
the parties involved. Finally, it is long past the time to reconsider a
health care system that is heavily dependent on litigation as the path
to medical treatment of sickness and injury.

83. BERTRAND DE JOUVENAL, THE ETHICS OF REDISTRIBUTION (1952)
(providing an elegant modern statement of the case against redistribution).

